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Abstract—In this paper, we consider an active eavesdropping
scenario in a cooperative system consisting of a source, a des-
tination, and an active eavesdropper with multiple decode-and-
forward relays. Considering an existing assumption in which an
eavesdropper is also a part of network, a proactive relay selection
by the eavesdropper is proposed. The best relay which maximizes
the eavesdropping rate is selected by the eavesdropper. A relay
selection scheme is also proposed to improve the secrecy of the
system by minimizing the eavesdropping rate. Performances of
these schemes are compared with two passive eavesdropping sce-
narios in which the eavesdropper performs selection and maximal
ratio combining on the relayed links. A realistic channel model
with independent non-identical links between nodes and direct
links from the source to both the destination and eavesdropper
are assumed. Closed-form expressions for the secrecy outage
probability (SOP) of these schemes in Rayleigh fading channel
are obtained. It is shown that the relay selection by the proactive
eavesdropper is most detrimental to the system as not only the
SOP increases with the increase in the number of relays, but its
diversity also remains unchanged.
Index Terms—Active eavesdropping, cooperative system,
Decode-and-forward relay, relay selection, secrecy outage prob-
ability.
I. INTRODUCTION
Due to the inherent openness of wireless medium, wireless
networks are vulnerable to illegitimate eavesdropping. Over
recent years, physical layer security has become a promising
technique to secure wireless communications by utilizing the
physical channel properties of both legitimate and illegitimate
users [1]–[3].
Based on the classical wiretap channel framework, various
cooperative transmission techniques using relays have been
developed against eavesdropping. Relays can cooperate mainly
in three schemes or a mixture of these schemes: i) cooperative
beamforming [4], ii) cooperative jamming [5], and iii) relay
selection [6]–[16]. In cooperative beamforming, all relays
perform distributed beamforming towards the legitimate user
to transmit their received signal. In cooperative jamming,
they transmit interference or jamming signal to confuse the
illegitimate user. These techniques require complex signal
processing to find beamforming or jamming signal vectors at
the transmitters or receivers.
Deviating from the former two cases, relay selection
schemes select simply the best relay (based on different
definitions of being the best relay) among several relays to
forward the received signal towards the legitimate user [6]–
[16]. Based on global instantaneous channel state information
(ICSI) or statistical channel state information (SCSI) of the
links, optimal and suboptimal relay selection schemes are
developed. It is also shown that some of these relay selection
schemes can achieve full secrecy diversity. A major assump-
tion while achieving global ICSI in these works is that the
eavesdropper is another active user in the wireless network
[3], [17], and hence, logically there is no difference between
a legitimate or illegitimate user capability. It is also to be
noted that in all previously mentioned literature, relay selection
schemes are developed against eavesdropping to safeguard the
legitimate communication.
The literature above assumes that eavesdroppers only listen
to a transmission intended for the legitimate user. Recently,
a new kind of adversary is introduced in secrecy, which
proactively attacks the system to enhance its eavesdropping
performance [18]–[26]. In [18]–[20], a jamming signal is
transmitted to degrade the received signal quality of the
legitimate user when simultaneously eavesdropping. While
[18], [19] study methods to counter active eavesdropping,
[20] utilizes proactive eavesdropping for surveillance. In pilot
contamination attack [21], the eavesdropper sends identical
deterministic pilots as the legitimate receiver in the channel
training phase of a multi-antenna time-division duplexing sys-
tems, as opposed to random jamming signal. The beamformer
designed by the transmitter on this basis will significantly
compromise information to the eavesdropper. In the spoofing
relay attack proposed in [22], [23], the eavesdropper acts as
a relay to spoof the source to change its rate in favour of
eavesdropping. Detection of such spoofing attack is studied in
[24]. Active eavesdropping is also studied in massive multiple-
input multiple-output system in [25], [26].
In the above proactive eavesdropping literature, the eaves-
dropper jams, contaminates the pilot, or spoofs the desired
information signal from the source; however, it does not ac-
tively select the information source. In a cooperative network
where multiple relays are used to convey the message from
an information source, an eavesdropper can proactively select
the best relay to its benefit. Being a part of the network, an
eavesdropper either can pretend to be a legitimate destination
and thereby compromise the secrecy of the system, or can be a
legitimate user with a surveillance objective. An eavesdropper
proactively selecting a relay and its consequences on the
secrecy of the system has not been studied so far in the
literature.
Motivated by the above discussion, we have considered
a cooperative network where multiple decode-and-forward
(DF) relays can be used by a source to convey its message
to a destination. An eavesdropper proactively selects the
best relay to increase its eavesdropping information rate. A
realistic scenario is considered where both the destination
and eavesdropper receive the direct communication from the
source; however, the links between nodes are independent non-
identically distributed.
The main contribution of this paper in three fold:
1) We propose a proactive relay selection by the eaves-
dropper to enhance its eavesdropping capability. Such a
scenario is is not considered yet in the literature;
2) We also study two passive eavesdropping schemes,
where the eavesdropper selects the best relayed link in
one scheme and maximally combines all the relayed
links in the another scheme for comparison with the
proposed active eavesdropping. In addition, a passive
relay selection scheme based on the eavesdropper’s
channel quality is studied to improve secrecy from the
system’s point of view for the comparison purpose;
3) We consider a more general channel model where
links between nodes are independent non-identically
distributed, as well as with direct links from the source
to the destination and eavesdropper. 1
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Sec-
tion II describes the system model. Section III evaluates the
secrecy outage probability for different proactive and passive
eavesdropping schemes. The numerical results are presented
in Section IV, and conclusions are drawn in Section V.
Notation: P[·] is the probability of occurrence of an event,
EX [·] defines the expectation of its argument over the random
variable (r.v.) X , [x]+ , max(0, x) and max (·) denotes the
maximum of its argument, FX(·) represents the cumulative
distribution function (CDF) of the r.v. X , and fX(·) is the
corresponding probability density function (PDF).
II. SYSTEM MODEL
We consider a cooperative system with a source (S), a
destination (D), N DF relays (Rk, k ∈ {1, · · · , N}) and
an eavesdropper (E), as shown in Fig. 1. There exists direct
communication links from S to D and E. All the links
between nodes are modeled as independent non-identically
distributed Rayleigh fading channel affected by circularly sym-
metric independent additive white Gaussian noise (AWGN).
The signal-to-noise ratio (SNR) of the links between S-Rk,
Rk-D, S-D, Rk-E, and S-E are denoted as γsk, γkd, γsd,
γke, and γse. As the links are Rayleigh faded, corresponding
1Most of the literature in relay selection to improve security assumes
independent identical links, without direct links from the source to the
destination and eavesdropper [6]–[12], [14]. Some exceptions can be found
in [13], [15], [16], which consider either direct links or non-identical links or
both.
Fig. 1. System model.
SNRs are exponentially distributed with parameters βsk, βkd,
βsd, αke, and αse, respectively, where E{γ} = 1/β.
2 In the
first time slot when S broadcasts its message, it is received by
Rk, ∀k,D and E. In proactive relay selection by eavesdropper,
E selects the best relay which maximizes its information rate
or equivalently its link SNR and directs it to retransmit in the
second time slot.
The achievable secrecy rate of the system is defined as [1],
[2],
Cs ,
1
2
[
log2
(
1 + γM
1 + γE
)]+
, (1)
where γM and γE are the SNRs at D and E, respectively,
after maximal-ratio-combining (MRC) the direct and relayed
transmission in the second time slot. The multiplier 1/2 is for
the required two time slots to complete the communication
process. For the DF relay system, the rate of a dual-hop link
is limited by the minimum of the individual hop rates. This is
equivalent to the minimum of the individual hop SNRs. The
secrecy rate of a single DF relay, i.e., only for the kth relay,
following [8], [13] is
Cks =
1
2
[
log2
(
1 + γkD + γsd
1 + γke + γse
)]+
, (2)
where γkD = min (γsk, γkd). The distribution of γkD is also
exponential with parameter βkD = βsk + βkd.
III. SECRECY OUTAGE PROBABILITY
The secrecy outage probability (SOP) is defined as the
probability that achievable secrecy capacity is below a certain
threshold secrecy rate
Po(Rs) = P [Cs < Rs] = P
[
1 + γM
1 + γE
≤ ρ
]
, (3)
where Rs is the threshold secrecy rate and ρ = 2
2Rs .
A. Proactive Relay Selection by E (MAX-E)
In this scheme, E selects the kth relay for which the Rk-
E link SNR is maximum. Once the relay is selected by E,
Rk decodes the signal received from S and broadcasts it. The
SOP of the system can be derived from (3) by finding the
probability of the selection of the best relay and then finding
2The subscript denoting a particular path is omitted to show the general
case.
the SOP if the particular relay is selected. By summing up all,
SOP is obtained following the law of total probability as
Po(Rs) =
N∑
k=1
P
[
γke > γ
−
ke
]
P
[
1 + γsd + γkD
1 + γse + γke
< ρ
]
, (4)
where γ−ke = maxi=1,...,N
i6=k
{γie} denotes the maximum SNR
among the rest of the channels received by E except the kth
one.
The PDF of γ−ke can be obtained from the CDF of γe =
maxk=1,...,N{γke} following [13] as
Fγe(x) = 1 +
N∑
m=1
(−1)m
∑
m
e−xα
′
m , (5)
where
∑
m
=
N−(m−1)∑
i1=1
N−(m−2)∑
i2=i1+1
· · ·
N−1∑
im−1=im−2+1
N∑
im=im−1+1
, (6)
and α′m =
∑m
l=1 αile. The PDF of the r.v. γ
−
ke can be
expressed in the easily realizable summation form as
fγ−
ke
(x) = −
N−1∑
m=1
(−1)m
∑′
m
α′me
−xα′m , (7)
where
∑′
m
=
N−(m−1)∑
i1=1
i1 6=k
N−(m−2)∑
i2=i1+1
i2 6=k
· · ·
N−1∑
im−1=im−2+1
im−1 6=k
N∑
im=im−1+1
im 6=k
. (8)
Then, we can evaluate (4) as follows
Po(Rs)
=
N∑
k=1
P
[
γke > γ
−
ke
]
P
[
γke >
γsd + γkD − ργse − (ρ− 1)
ρ
]
=
N∑
k=1
[I1 + I2 + I3] . (9)
Assuming X = γkD + γsd, Z = γse and λ =
x−zρ−(ρ−1)
ρ
,
finally I1, I2 and I3 are expressed in the integral forms in
(17), (19), and (21), respectively. For the distribution of the
r.v. X , which is the sum of two independent non-identically
exponentially distributed r.v.s, we follow [27], where B1 =
βkDβsd
βkD−βsd
and B2 =
βkDβsd
βsd−βkD
.
B. Relay Selection by the System to Minimize Eavesdropping
Rate (MIN-E)
The eavesdropper in this section is assumed to be passive.
The system selects the relay to enhance its secrecy by choosing
the lowest quality link to E only. This means that the relay
having minimum instantaneous SNR among all the links
tapped by E is selected. Following the law of total probability,
the SOP can be obtained as
Po(Rs) =
N∑
k=1
P
[
γke < γ
−
ke
]
P
[
1 + γsd + γkD
1 + γse + γke
< ρ
]
=
N∑
k=1
P
[
γke < γ
−
ke
]
P
[
γke >
γsd + γkD − ργse − (ρ− 1)
ρ
]
,
(10)
where γ−ke = mini=1,...,N
i6=k
{γie}.
The PDF of the r.v. γ−ke can be easily obtained from the
definition of CDF and differentiating it as
fγ−
ke
(y) = α exp (−αy) , (11)
where α =
∑N
i=1
i6=k
αie. Then (10), can be evaluated as
Po(Rs) =
N∑
k=1
P
[
γkD + γsd − ργse − (ρ− 1)
ρ
≤ γke ≤ γke
−
]
=
N∑
k=1
[I4 + I5] . (12)
For the derivation above, we assume X = γkD+γsd and λ =
x−ρz−(ρ−1)
ρ
. I4 and I5 can be expressed in the integral form
in (23) and (25), respectively. Their solutions can be stated in
(24) and (26), where B1 =
βkDβsd
βkD−βsd
and B2 =
βkDβsd
βsd−βkD
are
due to the PDF of X .
C. Best Relayed Link Selection at E while MRC at D (MAX-
MRC)
In this section E is assumed to be a passive listener. In the
first time slot, E simply chooses the best relayed link among
all, and performs MRC with the direct transmission. No relay
selection is involved. D performs MRC with all the relayed
and direct links received by it in the first and second time
slots. From (3), we obtain the SOP of the system as
Po(Rs) = P
[
1 + γsd +
∑N
k=1 γkD
1 + γse + γe
< ρ
]
= 1− P
[
γe ≤
∑N
k=0 γkD − ργse − (ρ− 1)
ρ
]
= 1−
∫ ∞
0
∫ ∞
ρz+ρ−1
FY (λ) fX(x)dxfZ (z)dz. (13)
For the derivation above, we assume γe = max∀k γke, γ0D =
γsd, Y = γe, X =
∑N
k=0 γkD , Z = γse, and λ =
x−zρ−(ρ−1)
ρ
.
For the PDF of X , we follow the PDF of the sum of N + 1
independent non-identically distributed exponential r.v.s from
[27] as,
f(t) =
N∑
i=1
∏N
j=1 λj∏N
j=1
j 6=i
(λj − λi)
e−tλi , (14)
where λi, ∀i, are the parameters of the exponential distribu-
tion. We substitute the CDF of γe and PDF of X from (5)
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Fig. 2. SOP versus SNR of MAX-E and MIN-E for different N and Rs
values, with 1/αke = 3 dB, ∀k, 1/βsd = 3 dB, 1/αse = 0 dB, and
1/βsk = 1/βkd .
and (14), respectively, in (13) to obtain the SOP expression in
(27).
D. MRC of All Relayed Links with the Direct Links at E and
D (MRC-MRC)
This section discusses the SOP when E andD both combine
signals received in the first and second time slots using MRC.
The SNRs at D and E are γM = γsd +
∑N
k=1 γkD and γE =
γse +
∑N
k=1 γke, respectively. The SOP of the MRC-MRC
technique can be obtained from (3) as
Po(Rs) =
∫ ∞
0
FγM (ρx+ ρ− 1) fγE (x)dx. (15)
For the distribution of γM and γE , we use the PDF of the sum
of N + 1 independent non-identically distributed r.v.s [27].
Substituting the CDF and PDF, SOP can be evaluated as
Po(Rs) =
∫ ∞
0
N+1∑
i=1
N+1∑
p=1
∏N+1
j=1
j 6=i
βjD
∏N+1
q=1 αqe∏N+1
j=1
j 6=i
(βjD − βiD)
∏N+1
q=1,
q 6=p
(αqe − αpe)
× (1− exp [−βiD (ρ− 1 + ρx)]) e
−αpexdx, (16)
whose solution is shown in (28).
IV. NUMERICAL RESULTS
In this section, numerical results are plotted along with sim-
ulation results to verify the analytical findings. It is assumed
that the AWGN affects all receiving nodes equally. Unless
otherwise specified, Po(Rs) is plotted against SNR with SNR
divided equally between S − Rk and Rk − D , ∀k. The
direct link average SNRs are considered as 1/βsd = 3 dB
and 1/αse = 0 dB. The required threshold Rs is assumed
either 0 or 1 bits per channel use (bpcu). Secrecy outage
probability with Rs = 0 provides the intercept probability
by E, as an intercept event occurs when the secrecy capacity
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Fig. 3. SOP versus SNR of MAX-E and MIN-E in balanced (1/βsk =
1/βkd) and unbalanced case (1/βsk = 30 dB) with 1/αke = {0, 3, 6, 9}
dB, k = 1, · · · , 4, 1/βsd = 3 dB, 1/αse = 0 dB.
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Fig. 4. SOP versus SNR of all schemes for N = 2, 4 with Rs = 1 bpcu,
1/βsd = 3 dB, 1/αse = −3 dB, and having all other channel parameters
non-identical.
becomes negative [8]. These particular parameter values are
only for the illustration purpose. Other values provide the same
trend in the figure; results are not included here due to space
limitations.
Fig. 2 compares the proposed relay selection schemes,
MAX-E and MIN-E, by increasing N from 1 to 4. Eavesdrop-
ping link average SNRs are considered equal with 1/αke = 3
dB, ∀k. It can be observed that not only Po(Rs) is worse for
MAX-E, but it also increases with the increase in N , while it
decreases for MIN-E. MAX-E is exactly the requirement from
the E’s perspective; however, it is detrimental to the system
which tries to avoid eavesdropping. Moreover, it can be seen
that performances do not change equally with the increase in
N . The change is more when N is increased from 1 to 2;
thereafter, the changes diminish with subsequent increase in
N . In addition, it is noticed that thoughN increases, the slopes
of the curves do not change. Furthermore, it is also observed
that SOP increases with the increase in Rs. However,N affects
less at higher Rs as curves for Rs = 1 are more closely spaced
than Rs = 0.
Fig. 3 compares MAX-E and MIN-E for N = 4 when
the eavesdropping link average SNRs are all different, i.e.,
1/αke = 0, 3, 6, and 9 dB, respectively, for k = 1, · · · 4. Two
cases are depicted: balanced and unbalanced. In the balanced
case, 1/βsk = 1/βkd, ∀k, whereas, in the unbalanced case
1/βsk = 30 dB, ∀k, 1/βkd, ∀k, increases as SNR in the x-axis.
It can be observed that in the balanced case, the performances
improve with SNR; on the contrary, in the unbalanced case,
the performances saturate depending on the SNR of the S−Rk
links. In the DF relay systems, the dual hop SNR is constrained
by the minimum of the individual hop SNRs, and hence, the
observation. The observation would have been similar if 1/βkd
had been fixed to a particular SNR as well.
Fig. 4 compares the performances of all schemes when each
of the S − Rk −D branch effective SNRs, as well as all the
eavesdropping link average SNRs are different for N = 2
and N = 4, respectively. When N = 2, 1/αke = 6, 9 dB
for k = 1, 2, whereas when N = 4, 1/αke = 0, 3, 6, 9 dB,
for k = 1, · · · , 4. 1/αse = −3 dB is considered to make
it different from other eavesdropping links. A balanced case,
i.e., 1/βsk = 1/βkd is considered. When N = 2, 1/βsk is
assumed to be 20% and 30% for k = 1, 2, respectively, of the
SNR representing x-axis. When N = 4, 1/βsk is assumed to
be 5, 10, 15, and 20% for k = 1, · · · , 4, respectively, to make
the total S −Rk −D, ∀k, link SNRs 100%.
It is observed that for a given N , the proactive relay
selection by E, MAX-E, is the worst for the system, although
the best for E. Though, both MAX-E and MAX-MRC select
the maximum eavesdropping channel quality for them, the
proactive eavesdropping is better than the passive eavesdrop-
ping from E’s perspective. The best scheme for the system
secrecy is MAX-MRC as D performs MRC combining. From
E’s perspective, MRC-MRC is better than MAX-MRC as E
is able to perform MRC on the relayed signals.
Although the systems with N = 2 and N = 4 are not
comparable as parameters are different, it can be noticed
that the secrecy diversity order-the slope of the curves at
high SNR-remains the same for both MAX-E and MIN-E.
Po(Rs) remains parallel as N increases, as seen in Fig. 2.
On the contrary, both passive eavesdropping scheme MRC-
MRC and MAX-MRC benefit from the increase in N , as the
secrecy diversity order improves to aid the system secrecy.
This concludes that proactive eavesdropping on the basis of
the relay selection is the best for E. Moreover, the relay
selection scheme, MIN-E, to aid the system secrecy based on
the minimum among the eavesdropping link quality, performs
worse than both MAX-MRC and MRC-MRC.
Simulation results exactly match the theoretical ones, which
confirms the validity of the analytical findings.
V. CONCLUSION
Relay selection is thus far considered to improve the se-
crecy of the system. Being part of a wireless network, an
eavesdropper might pretend to be a legitimate destination,
and actively select a relay to maximize its eavesdropping
capability. We study such an active eavesdropping scenario,
where the eavesdropper selects the best relay to maximize
the eavesdropping rate. Three other passive eavesdropping
scenarios are also considered focusing on the eavesdropping
link and eavesdropping capability for the comparison purpose.
Closed-form expressions for the secrecy outage probability are
obtained considering a more realistic scenario of independent
no-identically distributed channels and the direct links between
the source and both destination and eavesdropper. It is con-
cluded that the active eavesdropping is the worst for the system
secrecy, and the secrecy outage probability decreases with the
increase in the number of relays, while the secrecy diversity
remains unchanged.
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I1 =
∫ ∞
0
∫ ∞
ρz+ρ−1
∫ λ
0
∫ ∞
λ
fγke(t)fγ−
ke
(y)fX(x)fγse(z)dtdydxdz (17)
= −
N−1∑
m=1
(−1)m
∑′
m
ραse
(
B1e
−βsd(ρ−1)
(αke + ρβsd) (αse + ρβsd)
+
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